Blair was warned of looming disaster in Iraq

Iraq was not stablized because they had no intention of stablizing it. The Zionist Neocrazie Podhoretz is stepping up his cries to bomb Iran so that the whole world will hate America and attack us. Putin has just declared that an attack on Iran is an attack on Russia. The program is to fan the flames of war to a fever pitch and then bomb Iran to bring in Russia and China for WWIII and the global government “solution” to the problem they created out of nothing.

The whole entire thing is staged using Iraq as “the crucible of the New World Order” due to its occult significance going back to ancient Babylon with which the elite cabalist scum associate themselves. Tony Bilderblair, one of the architects of this mess, who just had a lovely dinner date with Cardinal Egan, claims he is innocent, but the fact is he is a war criminal just like Bush and they don’t give a damn about anyone but their own kind. Trust me, they know exactly what they are doing. There were no “mistakes” made in this war because it was all carefully choreographed many years ago.

PW

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Telegraph | Oct 27, 2007

By John Ware

John Ware discloses how the former prime minister was told repeatedly about America’s lack of planning for peace – and did nothing

Five days after the fall of Saddam, Tony Blair declared: “Iraq will be better. Better for the region, better for the world, better, above all, for the Iraqi people.”

Yet, as we know, four and a half years later, Iraq is far from a better place. It is still in pieces and the reality is that by invading Iraq not only did Britain help to break the country but we are no longer seriously trying to fix it. As No Plan, No Peace on BBC1 tonight and tomorrow will show, despite his promises, Mr Blair was aware before the invasion that America’s planning for post-war recovery was woefully inadequate — and so was Britain’s.

It has become clear that Mr Blair had severe doubts about US plans to stabilise Iraq after the invasion. There was no properly worked out strategy for the key longer-term objective of transforming it into a stable, prosperous nation that the Blair-Bush vision held out.

We know Mr Blair was aware that post-war Iraq might be heading for trouble because Lady [Sally] Morgan, his former political secretary, says he was “tearing his hair out”; Sir David Manning, his foreign affairs adviser at the time of the invasion, has said he was “very exercised about it”; Peter Mandelson has also said he knew the preparations were inadequate.

The fact that Mr Blair knew all this is potentially far more damaging to his reputation than his decision to put the full weight of his office behind the flawed intelligence that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction. For that, he had cover from the Secret Intelligence Service.

What, then, is his defence to the charge that he recklessly continued with the invasion, thereby sharing responsibility for the deaths of 100,000 civilians and 4,141 coalition soldiers — 171 of them British — the displacement of four million refugees inside and outside Iraq, and the cost of more than £5 billion

The defence that is emerging from Mr Blair’s friends and advisers is that No 10 was let down by the Bush administration.

All say his frustration stemmed from Britain’s inability to influence the Pentagon, under Donald Rumsfeld, on post-war planning. The hawkish Defence Secretary wanted a “lite” US footprint – a small invasion force that could be rapidly withdrawn afterwards.

This defence looks thin: it suggests that Mr Blair’s “hair-tearing” could not have begun until dangerously late in the day: not until January 20, 2003, in fact — eight weeks before the invasion. Only then was Rumsfeld put in charge of post-war planning, by a Presidential directive establishing a reconstruction unit in the Department of Defence.

That is precious little time: the US General George C. Marshall was given three and a half years to plan the reconstruction of Germany after the Second World War. So why wasn’t Blair “tearing his hair out” long before January 20? Sir David Manning, his foreign policy adviser, who went to Washington as ambassador after the invasion, said when he retired recently that neither he nor Blair “had any sense that the Department of Defence was going to take over the running of the country”.

Until then, he says, Mr Bush had assured them that the State Department, under the moderate Colin Powell, would be in charge. There had been “plans made and deployed by the State Department… It’s hard to know what happened.”

Yet this runs counter to what the Washington embassy was telling London in the run-up to the invasion. First, it was well known that very little of the State Department’s work could be seen as a blueprint for stabilisation and reconstruction. Rather, a series of study groups had been set up to engage Iraqi Americans in thinking about their country’s future after Saddam.

“It was never intended as a post-war plan,” says Ryan Crocker, the American ambassador to Iraq.

Secondly, it seems unlikely that Mr Powell ever wanted responsibility for post-war planning. He raised no protest when the President assigned the task to Rumsfeld.