16 “errors” made by de Menezes’ killers

The Times | Nov 8, 2007

by Sean O’Neill

The IPCC report highlighted 16 areas of concern arising from the Stockwell shooting which the police service nationally was asked to address.

The issues were raised with Scotland Yard 20 months ago and it is reported to have made significant progress in correcting mistakes made during the operation in which Jean Charles de Menezes was killed.

Independent inspectors say the Met has demonstrated a willingness to implement changes and learn hard lessons.

Nick Hardwick, chairman of the IPCC, said today: “The inspectors have reported that learning has been profound. Changes have already been put into effect and informed the successful handling of the terrorist attacks in London and Glasgow earlier this year.”

This is a summary of some of the key areas highlighted by the IPCC:

* Commander Cressida Dick was in command of all aspects of the firearms operation but there was potential for confusion between the respective roles of Gold and Silver Command and Designated Senior Officer (DSO).

* Despite being appointed as the DSO, Ms Dick was not present when the strategic briefing chaired by Commander John McDowall began. She had been directed to the wrong room.

* No formal recording was made of any of the briefings prior to the deployment of firearms and surveillance officers. There was no audio recording of what was communicated within the Operations Room.

* The strategy set by the Gold Commander was not implemented. The strategy made it clear that all persons leaving Scotia Road [the target address] would be stopped either as suspects or as potential intelligence sources. Six persons left the flats before Jean Charles de Menezes but none was stopped.

* There was a delay of several hours between the time the firearms team were requested and when they were deployed. When Mr de Menezes left Scotia Road at 09.33, CO19 officers were still not in place.

* There was a lack of clarity about the command to “stop” the suspect given the likely mindset of the firearms officers. They were deployed the day after unsuccessful bomb attacks in London and had been issued with dum-dum bullets.

* The S012 surveillance team, the CO19 Specialist Firearms Officers and those in command were not used to working together.

* Only the views of the surveillance team leader were communicated in relation to the identification of the suspect. The fact that two surveillance officers believed that the person being followed was not the suspect should have been communicated to Ms Dick.

* A surveillance log has was altered changing the meaning of an entry relating to identification of Mr de Menezes.

* The incident was not referred until 15.21 on Monday July 25 and until that time the IPCC was prevented from starting an investigation on the instruction of the Commissioner. The rationale given by the Commissioner for this decision relating was not correct.

* The differences in the treatment of police and civilian witnesses to this incident are not acceptable or justifiable. Members of the public were expected to be interviewed and make statements soon after witnessing a most traumatic incident without being able to confer with other witnesses and provide a joint account. The police officers involved were allowed to return to their own base, refresh themselves and confer.

* Officers involved in the incident wrote up their notes together. This is agreed current practice but makes those accounts less credible.

* Command and control of this incident was inevitably lost when CO19 officers entered the underground. Had there been any update regarding the uncertainty surrounding the identification at this point it would have been impossible to communicate.

* Events during July 2005 confronted the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) with a series of challenges that had not been experienced before. Whilst terrorist attacks on the transport system had been predicted, the MPS relied on the ACPO Firearms manual and the Kratos policy to combat such an attack. It is apparent that more was required.